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Foreign direct investment, FDI, has proven to be resilient during …nancial crises. For example,
FDI in East Asian countries was remarkably stable during the global …nancial crises of 1997-98. In
sharp contrast, other forms ofprivate capital ‡ows – portfolio equity and debt ‡ows – were subject
to large reversals during the same period (as documented by Lipsey (2001)). The resilience of FDI
during …nancial crises was also evident during the Mexican crisisof 1994-95 and theLatin American
debt crisis ofthe1980s. As a result, FDI in‡owsinto developing countriesare often viewed as stable
”cold” money, which are generated by long term considerationsoftheforeign investors. In contrast,
foreign portfolio investments, FPI, are often deemed as unstable ”hot” money, which are triggered
by short term considerations of the foreign investors.
A similar conclusion follows the analysis of UNCTAD recent data on FDI net in‡ows.1 This
data shows that total net in‡ows of FDI into developing countries were $187 billions in 1997, $188
billions in 1998, $222 billions in 1999, and $240 billions in 2000 (UNCTAD (2001)), while at the
same time net in‡ows of portfolio investments were much more volatile (see, for example, World
Bank (2002)). Using World Bank data on 111 countries, Albuquerque (2002) shows that 89% of
the countries in his sample have lower coe¢cient of variation of net FDI in‡ows than that of other
net in‡ows.2 Interestingly, Lipsey (1999) shows that the ratio of the volatility of net FDI in‡ows
to the volatility of other net long term in‡ows is smaller in developing countries than in developed
countries: The ratio of FDI’s volatility to other long-term ‡ows’ volatility is 0.59 in Latin America,
0.74 in South East Asia, 0.86 in Europe, and 0.88 in the US. Thus, the di¤erences in volatilities
between net FDI in‡ows and other types of net in‡ows are smaller in developed economies.3
In this paper, we try to explain why FDI in‡ows are stable, whereas FPI in‡ows are volatile
1Net in‡ows account for net investments made by foreign investors (that is, new investments by foreign investors
minus withdrawals of old investments by foreign investors).
2See also Bachetta and van Wincop (2000).
3The literature also has plenty of other sources of related evidence: Frankel and Rose (1996) show that the size of
FDI ‡ows reduces the probability of currency crises. Chuhan, Perez-Quiros and Popper (1996) show that FDI ‡ows
are less sensitive to shocks in other countries and to shocks in other types of investments. Sarno and Taylor (1999)
show that FDI ‡ows are more persistent than other ‡ows. Claessens, Dooley, and Warner (1995) provide the only
source of mixed evidence. However, they study a smaller sample of countries, which predates the recent international
crises.
2and tend to be withdrawn during liquidity crises.4 We also try to explain why the di¤erences in
volatilities between FDI and FPI are smallerin developed economiesthan in developing economies.
We do that by endogenizing the choice of foreign investors between FDI and FPI in a model of
an information-based trade o¤ between the two forms of investment. We believe that our model
sheds new light on thedeterminants of thecomposition ofinternational capital ‡ows, and generates
interesting empirical predictions and policy implications.
The model highlights a key di¤erence between the two types of investment: FDI investors,
who take both ownership and control positions in the domestic …rms, are in e¤ect the managers
of the …rms under their control; whereas portfolio investors, who gain ownership without control
of domestic …rms, must delegate decisions to managers, but limit their freedom to make decisions
becausethelatter’sagenda may not bealways consistent withthat oftheowners. Consequently, due
to an agency problem between managers and owners, portfolio investment projects are managed
less e¢ciently than direct investment projects. To be more speci…c, direct investors, who act
e¤ectively as managers of their own projects, are more informed than portfolio investors regarding
the changes in prospects of their projects. This information enables them to manage their projects
more e¢ciently.5 This e¤ect generates an advantage, with an added value in the capital markets,
to direct investments relative to portfolio investments.
However, there is also a disadvantage to the information that is gained by investing directly.
In our model, investors sometimes need to sell their investments before maturity because they
face liquidity shocks. In such circumstances, the price they can get will be lower if they have
more information on the economic fundamentals of the investment project. This is because when
potential buyers know that the seller has more information, they may suspect that the sale results
from bad information on the prospects of the investment, and will thus be willing to pay a lower
price. Thus, if they invest directly, the investors bear the cost of getting a lower price if and when
they are forced to sell the project before maturity.
Our model, therefore, describes a key trade o¤ between management e¢ciency and liquidity.6
4In this paper we focus on the di¤erences between FDI and FPI. As we discuss in the concluding section of the
paper, our approach can be easily extended to include debt ‡ows as well.
5For a recent survey on agency problems and their e¤ect on …nancial contracting, see: Hart (2000).
6Note that the interpretation of the word ”liquidity” here is di¤erent from the one in the phrase ”liquidity shock”.
Here, ”liquidity” means that when they invest in FDI, investors will face a less liquid market when they want to sell,
3Both sides of this trade o¤ are driven by the e¤ect of asymmetric information. When they invest
directly, investors get more information about the fundamentals of the investment, and thereby
can manage the project more e¢ciently, than their portfolio-investors counterparts. However, this
also generates a ”lemons” type problem when they try to sell the investment before maturity.
Therefore, this superior information e¤ect reduces the price they can get when they are forced to
sell the project prematurely.
This trade o¤ between e¢ciency and liquidity generates the di¤erences between volatility of
direct investment ‡ows and volatility of portfolio investment ‡ows: Investors with high expected
liquidity needs are a¤ected by the low price more than they are a¤ected by the management
e¢ciency, and thus, in equilibrium, will choose to become portfolio investors. Similarly, investors
with low expected liquidity needs will choose to become direct investors. This is consistent with the
casual observation that FDI investors are often large, deep-pocket, multinational companies with
low expected liquidity needs, whereas FPI investors are, on average, more vulnerable to liquidity
shocks. As a result, portfolio investments will be characterized by a higher probability of early
liquidation, and greater volatility, compared to direct investments.
In order to demonstratethe basicpoint, westart by analyzing a simplemodel with a continuum
of identical investors. Each investor has the same ex-ante probability of facing a liquidity shock,
and this probability is known in the market. This model describes an industry that consists of
investors with identical expected liquidity needs. We use the model to analyze the di¤erences in
direct-portfolio investment patterns across di¤erent industries; each industry is characterized by
industry-speci…c expected liquidity needs. We show that when there are some …xed set-up costs
to investing directly (e.g., costs of intra-…rm coordination and acquiring information), industries
in which investors are more vulnerable to liquidity risks, will be owned by portfolio investors. As
a result, these industries will be characterized by higher probabilities of early liquidations and
greater ‡ow volatility.
Thus, this basic model demonstrates a key trade o¤ between direct investment and portfolio
investment. However, it also has two limitations: First , it cannot explain di¤erences in volatility
between direct investments and portfolio investments when the two types coexist in the same
in the sense that they will get a lower price. A ”liquidity shock” means that an investor is facing a shock that forces
her to liquidate the investment.
4industry.7 Second, it understates the disadvantage of direct investments to investors with high
expected liquidity needs. This is because the expected liquidity need of an individual investor is
known in the market, and thus investors who have a high expected liquidity need do not get a very
low price when they sell their direct investments prematurely, as potential buyers know that the
sale is likely to be triggered by a liquidity shock and not by inferior information on the part of
the owner. (This is also the reason for the result that investors with high expected liquidity needs
choose portfolio investments only when there are some …xed set-up costs to direct investments.)
To relax these two limitations, we extend thebasicmodel to include two types ofinvestors. One
type has a higher probability of getting a liquidity shock, and theothertypehas a lowerprobability
of getting a liquidity shock. In this framework, the type ofan individual investor is not necessarily
known in the market. As a result, investors with high expected liquidity needs might be perceived
as having low expected liquidity needs, and su¤er from a very low price when they want to sell
prematurely. This generates an additional force that pushes investors with a high probability of
getting liquidity shocks to invest in portfolio investments: They try to separate themselves from
theother typeofinvestors. They do so by investing in portfolio investments, which work e¤ectively
as a signalling device.
As we show in the paper, in the model with heterogeneous investors, there exists a separating
equilibrium (for some parameter values), in which investors with high expected liquidity needs
invest only through portfolio investments, and investors with low expected liquidity needs invest
only through direct investments. This may occur even with no …xed set-up costs associated with
direct investments. This pattern can explain the di¤erences between the proportion of reversals in
the two types of investment.
Interestingly, for some parameter values, the model generates multiple equilibria: Either both
types of investors choose direct investments (a pooling equilibrium), or investors with high ex-
pected liquidity needschoose portfolio investments, and investors with low expected liquidity needs
choose direct investments (a separating equilibrium). This multiplicity of equilibria results from
asymmetric-information externalities among investors with high expected liquidity needs: When
more investors of their type choose direct investments, the re-sale price of these investments will
increase, and the incentive of each investor of this type to choose these investments will increase.8
7Since investors in an industry are identical, they all choose the same type of investment in equilibrium.
8The forces that lead to the existence of a separating equilibrium and a pooling equilibrium here are similar to
5This multiplicity can explain why some countries have more direct investments than others, and
why some periods of time are characterized by more direct investments than others. As we show
in the paper, when the two equilibria exist, the host country bene…ts more under the pooling equi-
librium than under the separating equilibrium. Thus, our model suggests a role for intervention
to encourage investors to choose FDI rather than FPI. The mechanism here is very di¤erent than
thosethat arediscussed in the literature in association with thebene…tsofFDI to thehost country.
Finally, weanalyze the e¤ect of transparency on thepattern ofinvestments observed in equilib-
rium. Ourmotivation is twofold: First, we wish to explain why the di¤erences in volatility between
the two types of investment are smaller in developed economies than in developing economies.
Second, the analysis of transparency is a natural extension of the model, as transparency miti-
gates asymmetric information, which is the source of the trade o¤ in the model. We introduce two
measures of transparency: Transparency between sellers and buyers, that we call capital-market
transparency; and transparency between managers and owners (when the manager and the owner
are not the same person), that we call corporate-governance transparency.
When the degree of capital-market transparency increases, buyers know more about thereason
for a sale, when a sale takes place. This reduces the degree of asymmetric information, and thus
reduces the disadvantage of direct investments. As a result, the likelihood of a separating equilib-
rium, in which investors with high expected liquidity needs chooseportfolio investments, decreases.
Thus, the model predicts that developed economies, in which capital-market transparency is ex-
pected to be higher, will have smaller di¤erences between the volatility of portfolio investments,
and the volatility of direct investments. When the degreeofcorporate-governance transparency in-
creases, portfolio investorscan sometimeget information on the fundamentalsoftheir projects, and
managethem e¢ciently. They can also decideto sell them when they observelow realizationsofthe
fundamentals. As a result, the di¤erencesbetween the two types ofinvestment becomesmaller, and
for someparameter values, theseparating equilibrium is eliminated, generating a smaller di¤erence
between the volatilities of the two types of investment.
We now brie‡y indicate the relation between this paper and recent literature. The literature
on FDI is vast and covers many issues related to FDI. For a good literature survey, see Bayoumi
and Lipworth (1997). Most of the papers in this literature, however, do not analyze di¤erences
those in Stiglitz (1975).
6in volatility between FDI and FPI. One explanation that is often mentioned to the di¤erence in
volatility between the two types of investment relies on the assumption that direct investments are
irreversible for some exogenous reason (for example: High exit costs). However, as Albuquerque
(2002) suggests, thisargument has two main drawbacks: First, withdrawalsofdirect investments do
not necessarily have to include liquidation of physical capital, and in fact, …rms have many other
ways to withdraw funds that were invested as direct investment (for example, selling shares).9
Second, in times of a crisis, not only FDI, but also other types of ‡ows might dry up, and thus the
relative stability of FDI remains a puzzle. Importantly, the liquidity of each type of investment
is endogenous in our model. In addition, our model sheds light on the di¤erence in the volatility
ratio between developed economies and developing economies, and this cannot be explained when
FDI is assumed to be irreversible or to have higher costs of exit. Albuquerque (2002) develops a
model aimed at explaining di¤erences between thevolatility of direct investments and thevolatility
of portfolio investments. His paper relies on expropriation risks and the inalienability of direct
investments, and thus is di¤erent from the information-based mechanism developed here.
Some papers in the literature use the asymmetric information hypothesis to address di¤erent
issues related to FDI. In Froot and Stein (1991), Klein and Rosengren (1994), and Klein, Peek and
Rosengren (2002), the hypothesis is that FDI is information intensive, and thus FDI investors, who
know more about their investments than outsiders, face a problem in raising resources for their
investments. Gordon and Bovenberg (1996) assume asymmetric information between domestic
investorsand foreigninvestorsto explain thehomebiasphenomenon. Razin, Sadka and Yuen (1998)
explain the pecking order of international capital ‡ows with a model of asymmetric information.
Finally, Razin and Sadka (2003) analyze the gains from FDI when foreign direct investors have
superiorinformation on the fundamentalsoftheir investment, relativeto foreign portfolio investors.
Importantly, none of these papers analyzes the e¤ects of asymmetric information on the liquidity
and the volatility of FDI and portfolio investments.
Although we write this paper in thecontext of international capital ‡ows, we believe themech-
anism we suggest here is more general, and can serve to analyze the trade o¤ between direct
investments and portfolio investments, or between management e¢ciency and liquidity, in other
contexts.10 In a related paper, Bolton and von-Thadden (1998) analyze a trade o¤ between direct
9For more details on this point, see Albuquerque (2002) and Hausman and Fernandez-Arias (2000).
10The model is especially relevant in the context of international ‡ows because there is a strong empirical evidence
7investments and portfolio investments. Their model, however, is not based on the di¤erences in
information that each one of these investments provides. They also do not analyze the volatility of
di¤erent investments in equilibrium. To thebest ofour knowledge, our paper is the …rst paperthat
looks at an information-based trade o¤ between direct investments and portfolio investments, and
analyzes the e¤ect of this trade o¤ on the volatility of the di¤erent investments.11 Our paper also
touches on other issues that have been discussed in the …nance literature. Admati and P‡eiderer
(1991) discuss the incentive of traders to reveal the fact that they are trading for liquidity reasons
and not because of bad information. Admati and P‡eiderer (1988) and Foster and Viswanathan
(1990) point to the existence of externalities between traders who trade for liquidity reasons.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the basic model with
one type of investor. In Section 3, we study the basic trade o¤ between direct investments and
portfolio investments, and determinethetypeofinvestment that ischosenin equilibrium indi¤erent
industries. In Section 4, we study the implications of our model for the probabilities of early
withdrawals of direct investments and portfolio investments. In Section 5, we extend the model,
and analyzethe pattern ofinvestments and withdrawals when there are two types of investors. We
use this framework to study welfare implications. Section 6 studies the e¤ect of transparency on
investment patterns in equilibrium. Section 7 concludes, and highlights additional implications of
our model. Proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
2 Analytical Framework
A small economy isfaced by a continuum[0,1] offoreigninvestors. Each investorhas anopportunity
to invest in one investment project. Investment can occur in two forms. The …rst form is a direct
investment (FDI). The second form is a portfolio investment. The only di¤erence between the two
forms of investment is that a direct investor will e¤ectively act like a manager, whereas in case of
a portfolio investment, the investor will not be the manager, and the project will be managed by
on volatility of international ‡ows, which can be explained by our trade o¤.
11Two other related papers are Kahn and Winton (1998) and Maug (1998). In these papers, the information held
by institutional investors does not always improve the value of the …rm, as institutional investors might use this
information to make trading pro…ts instead of to improve …rm performance. These models do not look, however, at
the decision of the investors on whether to acquire information when they might get liquidity shocks.
8an ”outsider”. We assume that investors are risk neutral, and thus each investor chooses the form
of investment that maximizes her ex-ante expected payo¤.
There are three periodsoftime: 0, 1, and 2. In period 0, each investor decides whether to make
a direct investment or a portfolio investment. In period 2, the project matures. The payo¤ from
the project is denoted as R, where R is given by:




Here, " denotes a random productivity factor (technology shock) that is independently realized
for each project in period 1; k is the level of capital input invested in the project in period 1, after
the realization of ". We assume that " is distributed between ¡1 and 1 according to a cumulative
distribution function G(¢) and a density function g (¢) =G0 (¢). We also assume that E(") =0.12
2.1 Management and E¢ciency
In period 1, after the realization of the technology shock, the manager of the project observes ".
Thus, if the investor owns the project as a direct investment, she observes ", and chooses k, so as


























In case of a portfolio investment, the owner is not the manager, and thus she does not observe
". In this case, the manager follows earlier instructions as for the level of k. A possible rationale
behind this sequence of …rm decisions, whereby the level of capital input k is determined ex ante,
has to do with a potential agency problem between the owner and themanager (who is responsible
for making these decisions). Loosely speaking, the latter is not exclusively interested in the net
worth of the …rm as is theformer. Forexample, with no explicit instructions at hand, the manager
12Our results hold for more general speici…cations. We use this speci…cation to simplify the exposition.
9may wish to set k at the highest possible level in order to gain power. As a result, when the owner
does not have information about the …rm’s productivity, she will have to set investment guidelines
for the manager (who knows moreabout " than she does) so as to protect her own interests.13 This
agency problem is not modelled explicitly herebecause wewant to focus instead on its implications
for the trade o¤ between direct investments and portfolio investments. What we do, however,
capture in our model is the spirit of the agency problem, and the ine¢ciency associated with the
fact that the owner of the project is not the manager.
The earlier instruction is chosen by the owner to maximize the expected return absent any
information on the realization of ", and is based on the ex ante mean of ": 0. Thus, the manager
will be instructed to choose k = k¤(0) = 1
A.14 Then, the ex-ante expected payo¤ from a portfolio
















Comparing (3) with (4), we seethat iftheproject is held until maturity, it yieldsa higher payo¤
as a direct investment than as a portfolio investment. This result re‡ects thee¢ciency that results
from a hands-on management style in the case of a direct investment. The disadvantage of direct
investment will follow from the possibility of a liquidity shock in period 1.
2.2 liquidity Shocks and Resales
In period 1, before thevalue of" is known to those who will belater informed about it, the ownerof
the project gets a liquidity shock with probability ¸ (0 <¸ <1).15 An investor that got a liquidity
13The argument, according to which the manager wishes to make larger investments and build an empire is common
in the corporate …nance literature. In such a case, if the owner cannot verify the information that the manager had at
the time of the decision, she will not be able to prove that the manager acted to maximize his own objective function.
As a result, a contract that instructs the manager to maximize the value of the …rm given his information will not
be enforceable.
14The current speci…cation, according to which the owner of a portfolio investment receives no information on the
realization of ", and thus instructs the manager to choose k according to the ex-ante mean of " is simple and is
intended to capture the spirit of the ine¢ciency. The result will hold under more complicated speci…cations. For
example, in Section 6 we study an extension, in which the owner observes " with some probability.
15Recall that in this section we analyze a model where all the investors have the same ¸. This assumption is relaxed
in Section 5.
10shock needs to sell the project in period 1. The underlying assumption behind this sequence is
similar to the assumption made by Diamond and Dybvig (1983): An investor that got a liquidity
shock, derives utility only from period-1 consumption. If she does not get a liquidity shock , she
derives utility from period-2 consumption. As a result, an investor that got a liquidity shock will
sell the project in period 1, as she cannot wait to collect the payo¤ in period 2. The project can be
sold to outside investors, who are not informed about ", but are familiar with the other parameters
of the problem.
There is also a possibility that an investor will sell her project in period 1 absent a liquidity
shock. This will happen if and only if she observes a low realization of ", in which case she has
superior information over the buyer, and can exploit it. Since portfolio investors do not observe "
in period 1, only direct investors will sell the project at that time absent a liquidity shock.16 All
kind of sales in period 1 occur simultaneously. Thus, buyers do not know thereason for a sale of an
individual project. They only know whether the project that is being sold was owned as a direct
investment or as a portfolio investment. Thus, and because only direct investments aresold due to
low productivity shocks, the price that direct investors can get when they try to sell the project in
period 1 will be lower.
We now derive the price that a direct investor gets if she sells the project in period 1. This
price is equal to the expected value of the project from the point of view of the buyer, given that
the buyer knows that the owner is trying to sell, and given that she does not know the reason for
the sale. We denote the threshold level of ", under which the direct investor is selling the project
without a liquidity shock as "D. Then, the buyer knows that with probability (1¡¸)G("D), the
owner is selling the project because of a low realization of ", whereas with probability ¸, she is
selling it because of a liquidity shock.
As we noted above, liquidity shocks are realized before productivity shocks. We thus assume
that if the project is sold because of a liquidity shock (that is, before the realization of " is revealed
to the owner), the value of " is not recorded in the …rm before the sale, and the new owner will
not know the value of " after the sale. However, if the project is sold because of a low realization
16This is again a result of our speci…cation, in which the owner of a portfolio investment receives no information
on the realization of " in period 1. The result will hold in more general speci…cations; see for example the second
extension in Section 6.
11of the technology parameter, the new owner will know the value of " after the sale. Note that this
is just an assumption regarding the technical details of the sale in period 1, and that our analysis
will not qualitatively change if we adopt another assumption.













The owner, in turn, sets "D, such that given P1;D, when observing "D, she will be indi¤erent






Thus, equations (5) and (6) determine P1;D and "D. We show in the Appendix that for each
¸ between 0 and 1, there is a unique solution for "D (denoted as "D(¸)) between ¡1 and 0. As
a result there is also a a unique solution for P1;D (denoted as P1;D(¸)). Importantly, "D(¸) and
P1;D(¸) are increasing in ¸: When ¸ is higher, the probability that an early sale results from a
liquidity shock (and not from a bad realization of the technology parameter) is higher, and the
price of the project in period 1 increases.
As for the portfolio investor, if she sells the project in period 1, everybody knows she does it










Solving for P1;D and "D, we can seethat "D <0, and thus that P1;D < 1
2A. Thus, the price of a
direct investment in period 1 is lower than the price of a portfolio investment in this period. The
reason is that when the direct investor tries to sell the project, the price will re‡ect the possibility
that the sale originates from bad information on the prospects of the investment project.
3 The Basic trade o¤ between Direct Investment and Portfolio
Investment
Following the discussion in the last section, we see that there is a trade o¤ between holding the
project as a direct investment and holding it as a portfolio investment. On one hand, a direct
12investment enables the investor to manage the project more e¢ciently. This increases the return
that she gets in case shedoes not have to sell early. On theother hand, when she holds the project
as a direct investment, the investor will get a lower price for the project if she sells it in the short
term. This is because potential buyers know that with some probability the project is being sold
because of bad information on the prospects of the investment. Thus, the additional information
that is associated with a direct holding of the investment is not necessarily bene…cial, as it harms
theinvestor whenshe tries to sell the project early. In this section, westudy thedi¤erences between
the expected payo¤s under the two forms of investment when all the investors have the same ¸.
Westart with thedirect investment. In this case, with probability ¸, theinvestorgetsa liquidity






With probability 1 ¡ ¸, the investor does not get a liquidity shock. Then, she will sell the
project if the realization of " is below "D(¸), and she will not sell it if the realization of " is above
"D(¸). ("D(¸) is determined by equations (5) and (6)). The total expected payo¤ in this case can











Thus, the ex ante expected payo¤ from a direct investment is given by:




















We now derive the ex ante expected payo¤ from a portfolio investment. When the investor
holds the investment as a portfolio investment, with probability ¸, she receives a liquidity shock,


















In order to determine whether, in period 0, investors choose a direct investment or a portfolio
investment, weneed to compareEVDirect(¸) with EVPortfolio. At this point, wemakean additional
assumption: We assume that, in period 0, there is an additional cost to make a direct investment.
This represents the initial cost of acquiring information via a direct investment. We denote this
cost as c. Then, it is clear that, in period 0, investors will choose a direct investment if:
Dif(¸) ´EVDirect(¸) ¡EVPortfolio > c:
Similarly, they will choose a portfolio investment if:
Dif(¸) ´EVDirect(¸) ¡EVPortfolio < c:
Proposition 1 studies the properties of the function Dif(¸).17
Proposition 1 For any ¸ between 0 and 1, Dif 0(¸) <0. Moreover, Dif(1) =0, and Dif(0) >0.
We now explain the intuition behind the proposition. When ¸ = 1, the investors know they
will have to sell the project in period 1. Thus, the (gross) return they get on the investment is the
price they will get in period 1. Moreover, when they sell in period 1, the price is not adjusted to
re‡ect any information on the prospects of the project. This is because potential buyers know that
the sale is a result of a liquidity shock. As a result, in this case the expected return on a direct
investment is equal to the return on a portfolio investment.
As ¸ decreases from 1 to 0, there are two opposite e¤ects on the value of Dif(¸). First, agents
know that witha higherprobability, they will not observealiquidity shock, and thuswill continueto
own the project until maturity. As a result, they value more the higher e¢ciency that results from
17Clearly, if Dif(¸) ´ EVDirect (¸) ¡EVP ortfolio = c, the investors will be indi¤erent between the two types of
investment. We ignore this case here.
14more information, and care less about the lower period-1 price that results from this information.
This e¤ect increases the di¤erence between EVDirect(¸) and EVPortfolio. Second, when ¸ decreases
from 1 to 0, the period-1 price will be lower if a direct investor tries to sell. This is because
potential buyers know that the sale is more likely to re‡ect bad information about the prospects of
theinvestment and less likely to re‡ect a liquidity shock. This e¤ect reduces thedi¤erence between
EVDirect(¸) and EVPortfolio. According to Proposition 1 the …rst e¤ect is stronger than the second
e¤ect. As a result, Dif0(¸) <0. Finally, following the above analysis, we can tell that Dif(0) > 0.
In Proposition 2, we study the optimal investment vehicle that is chosen in period 0.
Proposition 2 If c ¸ Dif(0), investors will always choose a portfolio investment in period 0. If
c = 0, investors will always choose a direct investment in period 0. If 0 < c < Dif(0), there is a
threshold level of ¸: ¸¤(c) (0 < ¸¤(c) < 1), such that if ¸ < ¸¤(c), investors will choose a direct
investment in period 0, and if ¸ >¸¤(c), investors will choose a portfolio investment in period 0.
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is straightforward given Proposition 1. We thus get that
when c is in an intermediate range, a direct investment will occur if and only if the probability of
observing a liquidity shock is below a certain threshold. Figure 1 demonstrates the choice between
direct investments and portfolio investments.
Note that in the current model, investors choose portfolio investments only when c >0. This is
a result of the fact that the speci…cation with homogeneous investors understates the disadvantage
of direct investments to investors with high expected liquidity needs. We address this issue in
Section 5, when we analyze a model with heterogeneous investors.
4 The Probability of Midstream Sales of the Investment Project
On the basis of the trade o¤ between the two types of investment, we analyze the probability
that foreign investors will sell their investment in period 1, and withdraw their money out of the

























Figure 1: The Choice between Direct Investment and Portfolio Investment
where ¸ is the probability of a sale that results from a liquidity shock, and (1¡¸)G"D(¸) is the
probability of a sale that results from a technology shock. In case of a portfolio investment, an
early sale can result only from a liquidity shock, and thus the probability of an early sale is simply
given by:
¸:
Wenow considertwo industries. Oneindustry is characterized by a lower probability ofliquidity
shocks(a lower¸), andtheotheris characterized by a higherprobability ofliquidity shocks(ahigher
¸). Both industries are characterized by the same cost of acquiring information (c is the same).
Supposethat thedi¤erences between the two industries aresuch that in the…rst industry, investors
invest via a direct investment, and in the second industry they invest via a portfolio investment
(that is, in the …rst industry, ¸ < ¸¤(c), and in the second industry, ¸ >¸¤(c)). What will be the
di¤erence between the probabilities of early sales in the two industries? Here, there are two e¤ects.
First, thehigher probability ofa liquidity shock intheindustry with portfolio investmentsgenerates
a higher probability of an early sale in this industry. Second, the possibility of a sale that is based
on a technology shock exists only in the industry with direct investments. This e¤ect pushes up the
16probability of an early sale in the industry with direct investments. When the di¤erences between
the ¸’s in the two industries are large enough, the probability of an early sale in the industry with
portfolio investments will be higher.
In Table 1, we present the results of a numerical example of our model. For the purpose ofthis
example, we assume that " is uniformly distributed between ¡1 and 1, and that A =0:5. Table 1
shows the optimal type of investment and the probability of an early sale for di¤erent levels of ¸,
and for di¤erent levels ofc. In the table, the optimal type of investment is determined according to
the rule in Proposition 2. Then, the probability of an early sale is equal to ¸ in case of a portfolio
investment, and is equal to ¸+(1¡¸)G"D(¸)) in case of a direct investment.
¸ "D(¸) c =0:1 c = 0:2
Investment Probability of Early Sale Investment Probability of Early Sale
0:1 ¡0:40 Direct 0:37 Direct 0:37
0:2 ¡0:28 Direct 0:49 Direct 0:49
0:3 ¡0:21 Direct 0:58 Direct 0:58
0:4 ¡0:16 Direct 0:65 Direct 0:65
0:5 ¡0:12 Direct 0:72 Portfolio 0:5
0:6 ¡0:09 Direct 0:78 Portfolio 0:6
0:7 ¡0:06 Direct 0:84 Portfolio 0:7
0:8 ¡0:04 Portfolio 0:8 Portfolio 0:8
0:9 ¡0:02 Portfolio 0:9 Portfolio 0:9
Table 1: Numerical Example - Probabilities of Early Sales
Using the table, we compare the probabilities of early sales between two industries that have
di¤erent levels of ¸, but the same level of c. We can see that in most cases, when the di¤erences
between the¸’sin thetwo industries arelargeenough, theindustries that haveportfolio investments
will have a higher probability of an early sale. The opposite case will hold only when the levels of
¸ in the two industries are very close.
In the remainder of the paper, when we analyze the reversals of the two types of investment,
we consider only the reversals that result from liquidity shocks. This is because of two reasons.
One, as we saw in Table 1, the liquidity shock is usually the dominant e¤ect behind the di¤erences
17in the amount of reversals. Two, according to many commentators, the volatility of international
‡ows around crisis times is usually not associated with bad fundamentals, but rather with some
shortage in liquidity. Thus, in this paper, we are more interested in reversals that are driven by
liquidity shocks.
To sum up, on the basis of Proposition 2, we know that industries with a high probability of
liquidity shocks aremorelikely to haveportfolio investments. As a result, wecan explain thehigher
probability of an early withdrawal of portfolio investments: Since these investments are owned by
investors that are more vulnerable to a liquidity risk, they will be liquidated more often. This will
lead to a higher volatility of portfolio investments.
5 Heterogeneous Investors
So far we have analyzed an economy (industry), where all the investors had the same probability of
getting a liquidity shock. Thisframework was e¢cient in demonstrating thebasic tradeo¤ between
direct investments and portfolio investments. However, it also had two main limitations: One, in
equilibrium, all the investors in the economy (industry) followed the same investment strategy.
Thus, we could not analyze the di¤erences in volatility between direct investments and portfolio
investments, when both of them coexist. Two, sinceall theinvestors were identical, theprobability
that an individual investor got a liquidity shock was known to potential buyers. This limited the
disadvantage of direct investments: Investors with a very high ¸, who have the lowest bene…t from
direct investments, expected that if they sell a direct investment in period 1, the price will not be
very low, as the market knows their ¸, and thus assesses a high probability that the sale results
from a liquidity shock. As a result, even for theseinvestors, portfolio investments dominated direct
investments only when we introduced a …xed positive cost c to investing directly.
We now extend the model to allow for two types of investors in an economy (industry). Wewill
analyze the pattern of investments and withdrawals when the two types of investors coexist. As
we will see, this extension sheds light on other e¤ects that determine the pattern of investments
and withdrawals. It will also generate an interesting welfare analysis. The main di¤erence in the
analysis resultsfrom thefact that when di¤erent investors have di¤erent ¸’s, it is not always known
in themarket what isthe¸ ofeach individual investor. As a result, when they want to sell a project
18in period 1, investors will sometimes face a pricethat does not re‡ect their true ¸. This may create
an incentive to signal the true ¸ by choosing an investment vehicle.
5.1 The New Framework
Suppose again that there is a continuum [0; 1] of investors in the economy. Proportion 1
2 of them
have high expected liquidity needs, and proportion 1
2 have low expected liquidity needs. Formally,
assume that the …rst type of agents face a liquidity need with probability ¸H, whereas the second
type of agents face a liquidity need with probability ¸L. For simplicity, we assume that 1 >¸H >
1
2 > ¸L > 0, and that
¸H+¸L
2 = 1
2. We also assume that c = 0. 18 Investors know their type ex
ante, however this is their private information.
The existence of heterogeneous investors does not a¤ect the payo¤s from portfolio investments.
Since owners of portfolio investments never observe ", they sell the project in period 1 only when
they get a liquidity shock. Since this is known to potential buyers, the price they will pay for a
portfolio investment in period 1 is 1
2A, as we had in (7). Similarly, theex-anteexpected payo¤from
a portfolio investment is 1
2A, as we had in (9).
However, the expected payo¤s from direct investments change. When there are heterogeneous
investors, potential buyers do not know the type of an individual investor. As a result, the ex ante
probability that an individual investor gets a liquidity shock may be di¤erent from the probability
that is perceived by the market. The price of direct investments in period 1, and the threshold
level of ", below which investments are sold, will depend on the probability that is perceived by
the market. Denoting the probability of a liquidity shock for an individual investor as ¸i, and the
probability that is perceived by the market as ¸m, we get that the expected payo¤ from a direct




















In this expression, the value of "D(¸m) is determined according to (5) and (6). Recall that
"D(¸m) is increasing in ¸m. Thus, in this framework, investors have an incentive to signal that
they havea high¸. Thispoint andthefact that ¸m may be di¤erent from ¸i will havean important
e¤ect on the type of investment that will be chosen in equilibrium.
18Note that our results hold in a more general setting, for any ¸H > ¸L, and for c > 0.
195.2 Symmetric Equilibria
We analyze symmetric equilibria, i.e. equilibria in which agents of the same type choose the same
type of investment. There are four potential equilibria, to which we refer here as four di¤erent
cases: 1. All investors invest in direct investments. 2. All investors invest in portfolio investments.
3. ¸H investors invest in portfolio investments, and ¸L investors invest in direct investments. 4.
¸H investors invest in direct investments, and ¸L investors invest in portfolio investments. Towards
the end of the section, we analyze the possibility of existence of other (non-symmetric) equilibria.
We start by analyzing the conditions that are required to establish each one of thefour cases as
an equilibrium. Then, we characterize the equilibrium outcomes under di¤erent parameter values.
Case 1: Both ¸H and ¸L investors invest in direct investments
In this case, in the proposed equilibrium, when an investor wants to sell her project in period
1, potential buyers assess a probability of 1
2 that the investor is trying to sell because of a liquidity
need. This is because all the investors use the same investment vehicle, and thus in case of an
early sale, potential buyers do not know the type of the investor that is trying to sell (recall that
¸H+¸L
2 = 1
2). Thus, both types of investors will sell because of bad information when they observe
a signal telling them that " < "D(1





2A . If an investor
diverged from this proposed equilibrium strategy and invested in a portfolio investment, potential
buyers would know that if she sells the project it is because of a liquidity shock. Then, the price
she will get will be: 1























Case 2: Both ¸H and ¸L investors invest in portfolio investments
In this case, in theproposed equilibrium, thereareonly portfolio investments, and thusinvestors
sell their project in period 1 only because of a liquidity shock. If an investor diverges from this
equilibrium and holds a direct investment, she may try to sell in period 1 following a low realization
of". Inthiscase, giventhat theequilibriumbehaviorofall theinvestorsisidentical, potential buyers
20will not know her type, and the price she will get will be: (1+"D(1
2))
2
2A . As a result, the conditions
that we need in order to establish this case as an equilibrium, are the opposite conditions than the





















Case 3: ¸H investors invest in portfolio investments, ¸L investors invest in direct
investments
In this case, in the proposed equilibrium, there is separation between ¸H investors and ¸L
investors. Thus, when a ¸L investor wants to sell her direct investment in period 1, potential
buyers know her type, and assess a probability of ¸L that she is selling because of a liquidity need.
¸H investors, who follow the proposed-equilibrium strategy and invest in portfolio investments,
will get a price of 1
2A in case they sell in period 1. However, if a ¸H investor diverges from the
equilibrium strategy and invests in a direct investment, potential buyers will think she is a ¸L
investor, and then when she tries to sell, the price she will get will be
(1+"D(¸L))2
2A . Note that this
price is lower than
(1+"D(¸H))2




2A . Thus, a ¸H investor is punished when
she diverges from the equilibrium strategy. The condition, under which ¸H investors will invest in










Case 4: ¸H investors invest in direct investments, ¸L investors invest in portfolio
investments
Following the same line of argument that we used in Case 3, we derive the conditions, under











Proposition 3 characterizes the equilibrium outcomes under di¤erent parameter values. The char-
acterization of equilibrium outcomes is based on two threshold values of ¸H, which are de…ned
below:
¸¤


























Proposition 3 When 1
2 < ¸H < ¸¤
H, only Case 1 is an equilibrium. That is, both ¸H and ¸L
investors invest in direct investments.
When ¸¤
H · ¸H · ¸¤¤
H, both Case 1 and Case 3 are equilibria. That is, either both ¸H and
¸L investors invest in direct investments, or ¸H investors invest in portfolio investments and ¸L
investors invest in direct investments.
When ¸¤¤
H < ¸H < 1, only Case 3 is an equilibrium. That is, ¸H investors invest in portfolio
investments and ¸L investors invest in direct investments.
Interestingly, in contrast to themodel withhomogeneousinvestors, herewehave an equilibrium,
in which some investors choose direct investments, whereas others choose portfolio investments.
Moreover, here, investors choose portfolio investments even if thereis no immediatecost associated
with the direct investments (c = 0). As we noted above, the main di¤erence between the current
model and the model discussed in the previous sections is that here potential buyers do not know
the type of an individual investor. As a result, an investor with a very high expected liquidity
need may have to sell the project at a very low price, because the market perceives the expected
liquidity need to be low. Thus, in some cases, investors with high ¸’s choose portfolio investments
in order to distinguish themselves from investors with low ¸’s and avoid the low period-1 prices.
22Proposition 3 shows that the only investment patterns that exist in a symmetricequilibrium are
represented by Case 1 - a pooling equilibrium, in which all investors invest in direct investments
- and Case 3 - a separating equilibrium, in which ¸H investors invest in portfolio investments
and ¸L investors invest in direct investments. Case 3 is the case where portfolio investments are
reversed more often and are more volatile than direct investments. This case is consistent with the
casual observation that FDI investors are often large and stable multinational companies with low
expected liquidity needs, whereas portfolio investors are, on average, more vulnerable to liquidity
shocks. Case 1 is a case where the two types of investment have the same amount of reversals.
In equilibrium, there is no case where direct investments are reversed more often than portfolio
investments. This is because ¸L investors always invest in direct investments, as they care less
about the price they will get in period 1, and prefer to stick with the more e¢cient investment.
As Proposition 3 shows, thelevel of ¸H a¤ects the set ofpossibleequilibria. When ¸H is higher
than ¸¤¤
H, the di¤erence between ¸L and ¸H is so large that investors with high expected liquidity
needs (¸H investors) never invest in direct investments. In this case, ¸H investors prefer to invest
in a less e¢cient investment in order not to be perceived as low-¸ investors and get a low price
when they need to sell in period 1.
When ¸H is between ¸¤
H and ¸¤¤
H, the di¤erence between ¸L and ¸H is smaller. As a result,
we have an equilibrium, in which ¸H investors invest in direct investments. However, there is also
another equilibrium, in which they invest in portfolio investments. The reason for the multiplicity
of equilibria is the existence of externalities among ¸H investors. A ¸H investor bene…ts from
having other investors of her type investing in the same type of investment. This is because, then,
when she tries to sell the project, the price will not be that low since the market knows that the
sale is very likely to be driven by a liquidity shock. As a result, when all ¸H investors invest in
portfolio investments, an individual ¸H investor would like to do the same thing in order to avoid
the low price when she needs to sell (given that she needs to sell quite often). Similarly, when
all ¸H investors invest in direct investments, an individual ¸H investor would like to invest in a
portfolio investment as well.
When ¸H is lowerthan ¸¤
H, ¸H investorsalways invest indirect investments. Here, thedi¤erence
between ¸L and ¸H is small, and the dominant factor that determines the behavior of ¸H investors
is the greater e¢ciency associated with direct investments.
23Thus, Proposition 3 predicts that economies with large di¤erences between theexpected liquid-
ity needs of di¤erent investors are more likely to exhibit separating equilibria with large di¤erences
in volatility between direct investments and portfolio investments. The existence of multiple equi-
libria for a certain range of the parameters implies that we may have jumps from an equilibrium
with a lot of direct investments to an equilibrium with much less direct investments. This may
explain why some countries have more direct investments than others, and why some periods of
time are characterized by more direct investments than others.
Table 2 presents a numerical example that is based again on the case of a uniform distribution.
The table shows the possible equilibria for di¤erent values of ¸H, and demonstrates the results of
Proposition 3.
¸L, ¸H Possible Equilibria
Case 1 Case 3
¸L =0, ¸H =1 +
¸L =0:1, ¸H =0:9 +
¸L =0:2, ¸H =0:8 +
¸L =0:3, ¸H =0:7 + +
¸L =0:4, ¸H =0:6 +
¸L =0:5, ¸H =0:5 +
Table 2: Numerical Example - Equilibrium Outcomes for di¤erent values of ¸H
At theend ofthecharacterization oftheequilibriumoutcomes, we wish to discuss the possibility
of existence of non-symmetricequilibria in themodel, and show that our conclusions do not change
when such equilibria are considered. The proof of Proposition 3 demonstrates that ¸L investors
will choose direct investments under all circumstances. Thus, a non-symmetric equilibrium can be
only a case where some ¸H investors choose direct investments, whereas others choose portfolio
investments. When 1
2 < ¸H < ¸¤
H, Case 1 is the only symmetric equilibrium, and we can show
that the model does not have a non-symmetric equilibrium. This is because in this range of
parameters, a ¸H investor chooses a direct investment even when all other ¸H investors choose
portfolio investments, (this is the reason why Case 3 is not an equilibrium in this range). Thus,
given that in this range, ¸H investors choose direct investments even when portfolio investments
24are most bene…cial, we can say that they will always choose to invest directly. Similarly, we can
show that when ¸¤¤
H < ¸H < 1, Case 3 is the only possible equilibrium of the model. When
¸¤
H · ¸H · ¸¤¤
H, we have two symmetric equilibria - Case 1 and Case 3 - and one asymmetric
equilibrium. In this asymmetric equilibrium, all ¸L investors choose direct investments, whereas
¸H investors split between direct investments and portfolio investments. This third equilibrium
does not changeourconclusions in any signi…cant way, asit also features more reversals of portfolio
investments than reversals of direct investments.
5.4 Welfare Analysis
Aswenoted inthelast subsection, forsomeparametervalues, ourmodel hastwo possible equilibria:
One equilibrium is referred to as Case 1, in which both ¸H and ¸L investors choose direct invest-
ments, and theother oneis referred to as Case 3, in which ¸H investors choose portfolio investments
and ¸L investors choose direct investments. In this subsection, we study the di¤erences in welfare
across these two equilibria. As a starting point, we analyze foreign investors’ welfare, given the
current framework. Then, we use the result to study the implications for the welfare of residents
of the host country, which is the main focus of our welfare analysis. We analyze only the range of
parameters where the model has multiple equilibria. Aswenote at the end ofthe subsection, when
the model has a unique equilibrium, this equilibrium also generates the highest possible welfare for
the residents of the domestic country, and thus the analysis becomes straightforward.
The analysis of the ex ante welfare of the foreign investors in the current framework shows that
when the two equilibria are possible, all investors gain a higher expected welfare when the pooling
equilibrium (Case 1) occurs rather than when the separating equilibrium (Case 3) occurs. Thus,
the equilibrium represented by Case 3 is Pareto-dominated by the one represented by Case 1. We
now demonstrate this point.
Under Case 3, ¸H investors choose portfolio investments and gain an expected payo¤ of 1
2A,






This last expression is greater than 1
2A by the …rst condition that makes Case 1 an equilibrium.
Thus, when ¸H investors choose portfolio investments in equilibrium, it is because of a coordina-
tion failure. Due to the e¢ciency of direct investments, their welfare is higher under Case 1, but
they might end up in Case 3 because each ¸H investor believes that others will invest in portfolio
25investments.
As for ¸L investors, in both equilibria they choose direct investments. Under Case 3, their ex-







2) > "D(¸L), we know that ¸L investors are better o¤ in Case 1. The reason is that under
Case 1, ¸H investors also choose direct investments, and thus the price of direct investments in
period 1 is higher.
We now turn to analyze the di¤erences in welfare from the point of view of the residents of
the host country. This analysis is important for a country that opens its borders to foreign capital
‡ows, and is trying to assess what is the optimal composition of these ‡ows. Again, we will focus
on the range of parameters where there are two possible equilibria.
Up to this point, the residents of the host country did not havean explicit role in our model. A
natural way to introducethem is to assume that they own the local projects initially, and sell them
to foreign investors (supposethat thelocal residentsdo not havetheability to operatetheprojects).
We assume that there is a continuum [0,1] of local residents, each one holds an investment project
in period 0. At this time, local residents sell the projects to the foreign investors. After the sales
have taken place, the events in the model are exactly the same as we described before: In period 0,
foreign investors choose the form of investment, and in period 1 they make a decision on whether
to sell their investments or not. Given this structure, the welfare analysis from the point of view
of the local residents boils down to analyzing the price that they get for their projects in period 0.
In period 0, there are two types of foreign investors buying the investment projects from the
residents of the host country: ¸H investors and ¸L investors. Since the type of each investor is not
observable (and given the …xed supply of investment projects), in a competitive equilibrium, the
price of projects in period 0 will be determined by the lowest between the value that is incurred to
¸H investors and the value that is incurred to ¸L investors from holding the project. In our model,
this is always the value that is incurred to ¸H investors. Thus, ¸L investors capture some of the
rent due to their ability to maintain the project for a long time, and ¸H investors do not capture
any rent.
The price that local residents get for theprojects in period 0 will then be 1
2A when Case3 is the





when Case 1 is the realized equilibrium. As we showed
above, when both equilibria arepossible, the …rst expression is lower than the second one, meaning
26that domesticresidents get higher prices when Case 1 is the realized equilibrium rather when Case
3 is the realized equilibrium. The implication is that if both Case 1 and Case 3 are possible as
equilibrium outcomes, domestic residents arebetter o¤when Case1 is realized. This suggests that
the host country may bene…t from encouraging more investments to be in the form of FDI. When
only oneof thetwo cases is a possible equilibrium, however, theprice that domestic residentsget in
that equilibrium is higher than what they could have gotten under other alternative cases. Thus,
there is a role for intervention only when the model has multiple equilibria.
6 The E¤ect of Transparency
Thetrade o¤ between direct investments and portfolio investments in our model is based on asym-
metric information between sellers and buyers, and between managers and owners. Greater trans-
parency can reduce the degree of asymmetric information and alter the trade o¤ between the
two types of investment. In this section we modify the framework with heterogeneous investors
developed in the last section, and analyze the e¤ect of two measures of transparency. The …rst
one, capital-market transparency, measures the degree of transparency between buyers and sellers.
When this measure is higher, buyers are more informed about the reason, for which the investor
is selling the project. The second one, corporate-governance transparency, measures the degree of
transparency between managers and owners. When this measure is higher, owners, who do not act
as managers, are more informed about the fundamentals of their projects.
This analysis will help us explain the empirical evidence, according to which the ratio between
thevolatility offoreignportfolio investmentsand thevolatility offoreigndirect investmentsishigher
in developing economies than in developed economies. Our hypothesis is that both measures of
transparency are higher in developed economies than in developing economies. As we will show
below, in some cases, more transparency will lead to less separation between ¸H investors and ¸L
investors, and thus to lower di¤erences in volatility between the two types of investment.
6.1 Capital-Market Transparency
Assume that with probability ¯ (0 < ¯ < 1), the reason for an early sale in period 1 is known to
all potential buyers. If this event happens, potential buyers know what triggers theliquidation of a
27project (that was held either as a direct investment or as a portfolio investment): A liquidity shock
or a productivity shock. Assume also that sellers know whether the reason for a sale is revealed
to buyers or not. Clearly, when ¯ is higher, the ex-ante level of transparency in the economy is
higher.
The introduction of the parameter ¯ into the model does not change the payo¤s from portfolio
investments. Thus, for any value of ¯ between 0 and 1, buyers know that a portfolio investment
is always sold because of a liquidity shock. This is because the owner of a portfolio investment
does not observe information on the realization of the productivity level. As a result, the expected
payo¤ from a portfolio investment is independent of ¯ and is equal to 1
2A, as we showed before.
However, the analysis of direct investments is a¤ected considerably by the introduction of ¯.
Suppose that buyers know the reason for an early sale. If they know that the reason is a liquidity
shock, the price they will be willing to pay in period 1 will be 1
2A, which is equal to the price they
pay on a portfolio investment. If they know the reason is a productivity shock, no sale will take
place. This is due to the classic ’lemons’ problem: When a seller has superior information on the
quality of the project, and the buyer knows that the sale is driven by this information, there will
be no price that will satisfy both the buyer and the seller (see Akerlof, 1970). More technically, it
is easy to verify that if the reason for the sale is known to the buyer, "D (which is determined by
(5) and (6)) will be equal to ¡1, meaning that there are no sales in equilibrium. Then, denoting
the probability of a liquidity shock for an individual investor as ¸i, and the probability that is
perceived by the market as ¸m, we get that the expected payo¤ from a direct investment for this
individual investor is EV¯;Direct(¸i; ¸m;¯), where


































As in the last section, there are four potential symmetric equilibria, denoted as cases 1-4.
Proposition 4 characterizes the equilibrium outcomes that will hold under di¤erent parameter
values. Again we make use of two threshold values of ¸H, which are de…ned below.
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Proposition 4 For every 0 <¯ < 1:
When 1
2 < ¸H <¸¤
H(¯), only Case 1 is an equilibrium.
When ¸¤
H(¯) ·¸H · ¸¤¤
H (¯), both Case 1 and Case 3 are equilibria.
When ¸¤¤
H (¯) <¸H < 1, only Case 3 is an equilibrium.
Both ¸¤
H(¯) and ¸¤¤
H (¯) are increasing in ¯.
Proposition 4 showsthat the characterization ofequilibrium outcomesprovided in Proposition 3
holds forevery valueof ¯ between 0 and 1. Thus, at low levelsof¸H, Case1 is the only equilibrium,
at high levels of ¸H, Case 3 is the only equilibrium, and at intermediate levels, both Case 1 and
Case 3 are possible equilibria. The main point of Proposition 4 is that as ¯ increases, Case 3
becomes less likely to be an equilibrium and Case 1 becomes more likely to be an equilibrium.
More technically: As ¯ increases, the range of ¸H, in which Case 3 is an equilibrium (between
¸¤
H (¯) and 1), becomes smaller, and the range, in which Case 1 is an equilibrium (between 1
2 and
¸¤¤
H (¯)), becomes larger. Figure 2 illustrates thepossible equilibrium outcomes as a function of ¸H
and ¯.
The implication of Proposition 4 is that in economies with more transparency between sellers
and buyers, ¸H investors and ¸L investors are more likely to make the same investments rather
than separateand invest in di¤erent typesof investments, asthey do in Case3. As a result, in these
economies, the di¤erence between the volatility of direct investments and the volatility of portfolio
investments is expected to be, on average, smaller. This may explain why developed economies are
characterized by a lower ratio between the volatility of portfolio investments and the volatility of
direct investments.
The intuition behind the result is strongly related to the basic trade o¤ in our model. As
we suggest in the paper, when investors make direct investments, they get more information on
the fundamentals of the project, and can manage it more e¢ciently. However, this also has a
disadvantage, sinceifthey need to sell the project, this additional information will createa problem
of asymmetric information between them and potential buyers, and will reduce the price they can
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Figure 2: Possible Equilibria for Di¤erent Values of ¸H and ¯
get. As a result, in equilibrium, investors that expect to sell more often, might make portfolio
investments. When there is more transparency between buyers and sellers regarding the reason
for an early sale, the problem of asymmetric information becomes smaller, and thus investors that
expect to sell more often, have lower incentives to make portfolio investments.
6.2 Corporate-Governance Transparency
Assumethat in case of a portfolio investment, the owner of theproject observes " in period 1, with
probability ® (0 < ® < 1). If this happens, the owner of the project can act as a direct investor:
She can instruct themanager to choose theoptimal level of k, and she can decide to sell theproject
if the realization of " is below a certain threshold. Our interpretation is that a higher ® represents
a better ‡ow of information between the manager and the owner when the two are not the same
person. As a result, a higher ® represents a higher level of ex ante transparency. For simplicity, in
this subsection, we assume that ¯ =0.
Theintroduction oftheparameter®intothemodel does not changetheanalysisofdirect invest-
ments. It only changes the analysis ofportfolio investments. When owners of portfolio investments
observe ", they will be able to achieve the same management e¢ciency as direct investors. Thus,




(see (3)). Additionally, they also may decide to sell the project if the realization of " is below a
certain level. We denote this threshold level of " as "P. Using the same principles as in (5) and
(6), we derivethe following equation that determines "P as a function of ® and ¸m (the later is the






=(1+"P (®; ¸m))2 : (16)
This equation is slightly di¤erent from the one implied by (5) and (6), as it considers the fact
that a portfolio investor observes " with probability ®. As we show in the Appendix, for every ¸m
and ®between 0 and 1, there is a unique solution for "P between ¡1 and 0. As wealso show in the
Appendix, theanalysisofthe equation reveals that "P (®;¸m) is increasing in ¸m and decreasing in
®. Thus, when theprobability of a liquidity shock increases, there is, on average, a smallerproblem
of asymmetric information between sellers and buyers, and investors will sell their projects under a
larger rangeofparameters. Similarly, when the probability ofinformation being revealed to owners
increases, there is, on average, a greater problem of asymmetric information, and investors will
sell their projects under a smaller range of parameters. A direct result of the last property is that
"P (®;¸m) >"D (¸m) for every 0 <® <1.































When 0 < ® < 1, the basic trade o¤ between direct investments and portfolio investments is
similar to the trade o¤ in Section 5. On average, direct investments still provide more information
to owners. This enables owners to achieve more management e¢ciency, but also reduces the price
they can get when they sell their investments in period 1. As ® increases, the di¤erences between
the expected payo¤s from the two types of investment become smaller.
We now provide a partial characterization of equilibrium outcomes as a function of ® and ¸H.
Proposition 5 characterizes the range of parameters, for which Case3 is an equilibrium. This range
is also illustrated in Figure 3.
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Figure 3: Realization of Case 3 as an Equilibrium
Proposition 5 For every ¸H, Case 3 is an equilibrium if and only if ® 2 [®¤ (¸H);®¤¤ (¸H)].
Here 8 ¸H 2 [¸¤





, ®¤ (¸H) 2 (0;1), and
®¤¤ (¸H) 2 (0;1). ¸¤
H is de…ned by (11).
As the proposition shows, when ® increases from an intermediate level to a high level, Case
3 ceases to be an equilibrium. The reason is that as ® becomes high, the di¤erence in e¢ciency
between direct investments and portfolio investments becomes small. At the same time, if ¸H
investors invest in portfolio investments, period-1 prices of these investments will be high, and ¸L
investors will prefer to invest in portfolio investments themselves. As a result, when ® is high,
there cannot be an equilibrium, in which ¸H investors make portfolio investments and ¸L investors
make direct investments. The implication of this result is that countries with high levels of ® are
less likely to be in an equilibrium, in which there is a full separation between ¸H investors and ¸L
investors and the di¤erence in volatility between the two types of investment is large.
Theproposition also showsthat forsomerangeof¸H (between 1
2 and ¸¤
H), an increase in®from
a low level to an intermediate level will generate the opposite result. In this range, as ® increases,
Case3 becomes a possibleequilibrium, since ¸H investors have a higher incentiveto make portfolio
investments. Since in this range, ® is still relatively small, ¸L investors still prefer to make the
direct investments.
To sumup, thepropositionshowsthat forall valuesof¸H, an increase in®fromanintermediate
level to a high level will eliminate Case 3 as a possible equilibrium. However, in a partial range
of ¸H, an increase in ® from a low level to an intermediate level will make Case 3 a possible
equilibrium. Thus, the proposition provides partial support to the hypothesis that countries with
32higher levels of ® are characterized by smaller di¤erences in volatility between direct investments
and portfolio investments. Theproposition does suggest, however, that countries with intermediate
levels of ® are more likely to have Case 3 as an equilibrium than countries with high levels of ®.
As for the other potential symmetric equilibria: We can easily show that for every ® between 0
and 1, Case 2 and Case4 do not satisfy equilibrium conditions. In the general set-up, we could not
characterize the values of®, for which Case1 is an equilibrium. In order to shed more light on this
point, we ran a simulation for a uniform distribution of ". Table 3 shows the possible symmetric
equilibria for di¤erent values of ® and ¸H, when " is uniformly distributed.
®n ¸H 0:6 0:7 0:8 0:9 1
0 Case 1 Case 1, Case 3 Case 3 Case 3 Case 3
0:1 Case 1 Case 1, Case 3 Case 3 Case 3 Case 3
0:2 Case 1 Case 1, Case 3 Case 3 Case 3 Case 3
0:3 Case 1, Case 3 Case 1, Case 3 Case 3 Case 3 Case 3
0:4 Case 1, Case 3 Case 1, Case 3 Case 3 Case 3 Case 3
0:5 Case 1, Case 3 Case 1, Case 3 Case 3 Case 3 —
0:6 Case 1, Case 3 Case 1 — — —
0:7 Case 1 Case 1 — — —
0:8 Case 1 Case 1 — — —
0:9 Case 1 Case 1 — — —
Table 3: Numerical Example - Symmetric Equilibria for Di¤erent Values of ® and ¸H
As Table 3 shows, under a uniform distribution, ® does not seem to have an e¤ect on the
possibility of Case 1 being an equilibrium. Only the level of ¸H determines whether Case 1 will be
an equilibrium or not. Thus, the only e¤ect of ® on investment patterns in equilibrium is achieved
through its e¤ect on the possibility of observing Case 3 as an equilibrium, which was stated in
Proposition 5. Interestingly, thetable shows that for some parameters, themodel will not haveany
symmetric equilibria. We can show, that when this happens, the model will have one asymmetric
equilibrium, in which ¸H investors will chooseportfolio investments, whereas ¸L investors will split
between direct investmentsand portfolio investments. Clearly, this case exhibits smaller di¤erences
in volatility between direct investments and portfolio investments than Case 3.
337 Concluding Remarks
The model we developed in this paper describes an information-based trade o¤ between direct
investments and portfolio investments. According to the model, direct investors will be more
informed about the fundamentals of their projects. This information will enable them to manage
their projects more e¢ciently. However, it will also create an asymmetric-information problem in
case they need to sell their projectsprematurely, and will reduce the pricethey can get in that case.
As a result, for some parameter values, investors, who know they are more likely to get a liquidity
shock that forces them to sell early, will choose to make portfolio investments, whereas investors,
who know they are less likely to get a liquidity shock, will choose to make direct investments.
This result can explain the empirical …nding, according to which foreign portfolio investments
are more volatile and exhibit much more reversals than foreign direct investments. Moreover,
the model shows that transparency - both capital-market transparency and corporate-governance
transparency - sometimes reduces the di¤erence between the volatility of direct investments and
the volatility of portfolio investments. This result is consistent with the empirical …nding that the
ratio of FDI’s volatility to other long-term ‡ows’ volatility is smaller in developing countries than
in developed countries.
In the rest of this section, we highlight six additional implications of our model that seem to us
as promising directions for future research.
One, the information-based trade o¤ between direct investments and portfolio investments has
implications for the expected yields on each type of investment. Thus, in case of a liquidity shock,
direct investors get a very low return on their investment. Investors will be willing to bear that risk
and make direct investments only if they are compensated in the form of a higher expected yield.
In order to address this issue in an appropriate way, our model should be adjusted to include risk
averse agents. As for empirical evidence, we are not aware of any empirical study that looked at
thedi¤erences between theexpected yield on direct investmentsand the expected yield on portfolio
investments. We think our framework suggests an interesting testable prediction on this point.
Two, in a recent empirical study, Sorensen and Yosha (2002) …nd that greaterportfolio holdings
acrosscountriesareassociatedwithmorerisk sharing, whereasgreaterFDI holdingsacrosscountries
are not associated with more risk sharing. In our framework, the main risk that is associated with
foreign direct investments is the risk of a liquidity shock, following which the investment has to
34be sold at a low price. Since the liquidity shock has the same e¤ect on all the direct investments
that are held by the same investor, investors cannot diversify this risk by holding more direct
investments. Thus, our framework can explain why greater FDI holdings are not associated with
morerisk sharing. Asforportfolio investments, our framework suggeststhat liquidity shockshave a
smaller e¤ect on the returns from portfolio investments, and that these returns area¤ected mainly
by the technology shock that is speci…c to the investment. Thus, our framework suggests that
greater portfolio holdings across countries may be associated with more risk sharing. We believe
that a thorough examination of these issues is an interesting direction for future research.
Three, our model can be extended to include debt ‡ows. As is well known in the theory of
corporate …nance, the price of debt is less sensitive to problems of asymmetric information. Thus,
in our framework, the return on debt is expected to be less sensitive to liquidity shocks, and thus
debt is expected to attract investors with high expected liquidity needs. Thus, our framework can
also explain the high volatility of international debt ‡ows.
Four, in Section 6, we developed the implications of transparency for cross-sectional di¤erences
between volatility of FDI and volatility of portfolio investments. An interesting extension is to
analyze the implications of transparency for time-series di¤erences between the volatilities of the
two forms of investment. Thus, in times of crisis, transparency may be lower, and thus di¤erences
in volatility between FDI and portfolio investments may be greater. This is consistent with casual
empirical observations.
Five, in our model, portfolio investments occur sometimes as a result of a coordination failure
among investors with high expected liquidity needs. When this happens, the host country can
be better-o¤ if investors invest in direct investments. This point may have interesting policy
implications: The government can eliminate the bad equilibrium by creating better conditions for
direct investments, and thusgain a higher welfare. As our analysis suggests, thesebetterconditions
can be in the form of greater transparency, but also in other forms.
Six, a direct testable implication of our model is that FDI investments will be held by investors
with low expected liquidity needs. This seems consistent with the casual observation that deep-
pocket multinational companies, who are less exposed to liquidity shocks, hold a large amount of
FDI. A thorough examination of this point is an interesting topic for future research.
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Characterization of "D(¸)


















which can be written as follows:













Analyzing this equation, we can see that when 0 <¸ <1, then ¡1 <"D(¸) < 0. Moreover, as
¸ approaches 0, "D(¸) approaches ¡1, and as ¸ approaches 1, "D(¸) approaches 0.















=2(1 +"D)[(1 ¡¸)G("D) +¸] > 0:
Thus, for every ¸ in the range (0; 1), we have a unique "D(¸) in the range (¡1;0). Moreover,
by the Implicit Function Theorem, we know that "0
D(¸) >0. QED.
Proof of Proposition 1
We write Dif (¸) as it is de…ned by (8) and by (9):





















We start by computing Dif (¸) as ¸ approaches 0. We already know that as ¸ approaches 0,










We now compute Dif (¸) as ¸ approaches 1. We already know that as ¸ approaches 1, "D(¸)
approaches 0. Plugging this in the expression for Dif (¸), we get that as ¸ approaches 1, Dif (¸)
approaches0.
36Finally, we analyze Dif 0(¸). We write Dif (¸) as follows:





















Then, we compute Dif 0(¸):








































































¡1 "2g(")d" >0, we see that Dif 0(¸) <0. QED.
Proof of Proposition 3
We start by showing that Case 2 and Case 4 cannot be equilibria.















































































2A g (")d" > (1+"D(1
2))
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As a result, Case 2 is never an equilibrium.























and thus, Case 4 cannot be an equilibrium.
We now turn to analyze Case 1 and Case 3. Following the analysis above, we know that the
second condition to establish Case 1 as an equilibrium (the condition that refers to ¸L investors)
always holds. Thus, Case 1 will be an equilibrium if and only if the …rst condition holds, that is,

























































Similarly, following Proposition 1, we know that the second condition to establish Case 3 as
an equilibrium (the condition that refers to ¸L investors) always holds. Thus, Case 3 will be an









+¸H(1+"D(¸L))2 · 1: (19)
When we analyze (18) and (19), we can see that the LHS in (18) is higher than the LHS in
(19). This is because ¸L < 1
2, and because "D(¸) is increasing in ¸.




¢2, which is lower than 1. Then,
in this case, the LHS in (19) is also lower than 1. When ¸H approaches 1































38which, following Proposition 1, is higher than 1. Then, in this case, the LHS in (18) is also higher
than 1.
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¢ (1+"D(¸L)) ¢ [¸H +(1¡¸H)G("D(¸L))] < 0:
Thus, both the LHS in (18) and the LHS in (19) are higher than 1 when ¸H approaches 1
2,
lower than 1 when ¸H approaches 1, and monotonically decreasing in ¸H. As a result, there exists
a unique ¸¤
H between 1
2 and 1, at which the LHS in (19) equals 1, and a unique ¸¤¤
H between 1
2 and
1, at which the LHS in (18) equals 1. Given that the LHS in (18) is higher than the LHS in (19),




2 < ¸H < ¸¤
H, only Case 1 is an equilibrium; when ¸¤
H · ¸H · ¸¤¤
H, both Case 1
and Case 3 are equilibria; when ¸¤¤
H < ¸H <1, only Case 3 is an equilibrium. QED.
Proof of Proposition 4





































































Using the de…nition of EV¯;Direct(¸i;¸m; ¯), the arguments in the proof of Proposition 3, and
the fact that
R1
¡1 (1+")2 g (")d" >1, we get that Case 2 and Case 4 can never be equilibria, that
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i
is decreasing in ¸H, higher than 1 when
¸H approaches 1
2, and approaches 1 when ¸H approaches 1. Then, using the arguments in the
proofof Proposition 3, we get that both the LHS of(20) and the LHS of(21) aredecreasing in ¸H,
40higher than 1 when ¸H approaches 1
2, and lower than 1 when ¸H approaches 1. We can also see
that the LHS of (20) is higher than the LHS of (21).
As a result, for every 0 < ¯ < 1, there exists a unique ¸¤
H(¯) between 1
2 and 1, at which the
LHS in (21) equals 1, and a unique ¸¤¤
H (¯) between 1
2 and 1, at which the LHS in (20) equals 1.




2 <¸H < ¸¤
H (¯), only Case 1 is an equilibrium; when ¸¤
H (¯) · ¸H · ¸¤¤
H (¯), both Case 1
and Case 3 are equilibria; when ¸¤¤
H (¯) <¸H <1, only Case 3 is an equilibrium.
In order to show that ¸¤
H (¯) and ¸¤¤
H (¯) are increasing in ¯, we need to show that the LHS in
(21) and the LHS in (20) are increasing in ¯.









































we know that the expression in (22) is positive.
Applying similar arguments, we can also show that derivative of the LHS in (20) with respect
to ¯ is positive. QED.
Characterization of "P (®; ¸m)
Equation (16) can be written as:










































@FP (¸m; ®; "P)
@"P
=¡2(1 +"P)[(1 ¡¸m)®G("P) +¸m] <0:
Then, using the Implicit Function Theorem, we get that
@"P(®;¸m)
@® < 0, and
@"P (®;¸m)
@¸m > 0.
Moreover, when ¸m approaches 1, "P approaches 0; when ¸m approaches 0, "P approaches ¡1;
when ® approaches 1, "P approaches "D; and when ® approaches 0, "P approaches 0. Thus, for
every ¸m and ® between 0 and 1, there is a unique solution for "P between ¡1 and 1. QED.
Proof of Proposition 5
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Thus, the derivative of the LHS in (24) with respect to ® is negative. From Proposition 3 we
know that the LHS in (24) is positive when ® = 0, and since "P (®; ¸H) > "D (¸L), we know it is
negative when ®= 1. As a result, for every ¸H, there is a unique ®¤¤(¸H) in the range (0; 1), for
which the LHS in (24) is equal to 0. Condition (24) is satis…ed if and only if ®·®¤¤ (¸H).
Similarly, we can show that the derivative of the LHS in (23) with respect to ® is negative.
From Proposition 3 we know that the LHS in (23) is positive when ® = 0 and ¸H < ¸¤
H, and
negative when ¸H > ¸¤
H. Since "P (®;¸H) > "D (¸L), we know that the LHS in (23) is negative
when ® =1. Thus, we can de…ne a function ®¤ (¸H): 8 ¸H 2 [¸¤






®¤ (¸H) 2 (0; 1), such that: Condition (23) is satis…ed if and only if ®¸®¤(¸H).
Since the LHS in (24) is higher than the LHS in (23), we know that ®¤ (¸H) < ®¤¤ (¸H). As a
result, Case 3 is an equilibrium if and only if ® 2 [®¤ (¸H);®¤¤ (¸H)]. QED.
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